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Japanese Government Macro Policy:
Failure in the 1920's, Success (of a sort) in the 1930 1 s*
The Japanese historical case is often cited as an example of ac•
tive and effective government stimulation of economic growth, by fos
tering a market environment conducive to sustained expansion of output
by private enterprise.

The experience of the interwar period (between

World Wars I and II) suggests, however, that such a generalization is
too facile.

role.

In this essay I take up one aspect of the government's

It is my contention that the Japanese governmentts muddled ob

jective to retu~n to the gold standard at pre-World War I par, and the

attend,"'""l.t deflationary fiscal and monetary policies taken in the 1920' s,
were responsible for much of the retardation of growth in that decade.
While the radical change in objectives, and concomitantly in fiscal
and monetary policy, resulted in rapid growth from 1932 to 1936, and
thereafter for a few more years, by then it was too late:

the mili•

tary were increasingly entrenched in control of the government, on the

path toward the devastation of World War II.

I thus focus upon govern

ment macro policies in the fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate arenas,

excluding other areas of government policy.

I proceed first by describ•

ing briefly the interwar economy, next by discussing the macro policies,
and finally by raising some of the broader issues of the relationship

*A substantial portion of this essay is based on a paper entitled
"Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan", prepared for the sixth meet
ing of the Conference on Modern Japan held at Fajardo, Puerto Rico,
January 2•7, 1968. 1 am indebted to Yoshiko Kido for research
assistance ..
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of economic policy to the course on which Japan found itself in the
i930's.
The literature on the Japanese economy refers to the 1920 1 s as
a period of lagging or faltering growth.

Relative to both the long

run trend (since 1885) and to the World War I boom this certainly is
correct, as demonstrate d in Table l.
Table 1:
1880-1890
1890-1900
1900-1910

Growth Rate of Real Net Domestic Product
per Decade (per cent)
29.5
67.6
42.7

Note on Table 1:

1910-1920
1920-1930
1930-1940

61.5
33.4
72.1

Based on midpoint of five~year
averages.

Derived from Yujiro Hayami and Saburo Yamada,
''Agricultur al Productivit y at the Beginning
· of Industrializ ation", presented at Agricul
t;ure and Economic Development : A Symposium
on Japan's Experience, July 3-7, 1967, Appen
qix C (Tentative Estimates of National Income
and NDP at Market Prices).
The facts 1 of growth o.f Net Domestic Product and of agriculture and
manufactur ing--the two major components for which relatively good
data are available-.: suggest the following.

First, the growth of

NDP throughout the 1920's was indeed moderate but on the whole re
spectable, at a peak-to-pea k (1919-1928) annual rate of 3.2 p~r cent,
and trough-to-tr ough (1920-1930) rate also of 3.2 per cent.
the 1930 1 s, however, growth was considerabl y more rapid:

During

5.5 per

cent annually between 1928-1938 (the rate between 1930-1938, 5.9
per cent, is somewhat misleading since 1930 was at the bottom of re-
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cession while 1938 represented continued high growth).
Second, the increase in NDP during the 1920 1 s was entirely in
manufacturing and services; as a trend value added in agriculture
did not rise at all.

Not only was the stagnation of agriculture the

dominant contributor to the retardation of the overall growth rate,
it had important implications for intersectoral relationships and for
the growing agrarian distress.

This very poor agrarian performance

was true both of the 1920 1 s and the 1930 1 s.
Third, the year-to-year growth rate of NDP fluctuated consider
ably.

The absolute decline of 1920 was followed by a short-lived

boom, the Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake of 1923 by another short-lived
boom, while 1929-1930 saw another absolute decline (though the statis
tics indicate a substantially less drastic decline than my conven
tional impression).

Thereafter, the growth rate was rapid, except

for a brief slowdown in 1934.

Frobably methods for estimating NDP

(especially manufacturing value added) understate the actual degree
of cyclical instability.

For example, Professor Yasuba's index of

industrial production, while not substantially different in results
for the period 1919-1935. as a whole from that of Professor Shionoya,
measures an absolute decline of 1.4 per cent in manufacturing ~slue
added in 1930 and particularly 1931 (a further 5.5 per cent).

More

over, the NOP figures mask what happened in ~he major goods-producing
sectors.

Agricultural production fluctuated rather widely, and real

value added in agriculture even more (reflecting changes in the real

prices of output and of current inputsa-£6~tilizers; etc.).
These aggregate results carry over directly into pet worker and
per capita terms.

NDP per worker increased by 93 per cent between 1919

and 1938, and relative to total population by 78 per cent, with most of
the growth occurring in the 1930 1 s.

Agricultural output per worker

increased very slowly, and then only really after 1934 (when some de
cline in the agricultural labor force began).
Average personal consumption per worker and per capita also rose
moderately, though less rapidly than NDP since a higher proportion of
output was devoted to government expenditures and private investment. 2
Per capita average consumption grew only 5 per cent between 1922 and
1928 peaks, but subsequently declined almost as much to the low in
1932; the real increase came only thereafter.

Moreover, this average

level of living disguises what probably was an increasing inequality
of living standards.

The benefits of growth apparently accrued mainly

to owners and employees of large-scale enterprise, skilled workers,
government officials, l~ndlords, and professionals, while workers in
small-scale manufacturing and service establishments and most farmer~
had no improvement, and even declines.

For them productivity was vir

tually constant, and real wages (deflated for changes in the cost of
living), which remained high in the 1920 1 s, declined in the Great De
pression and were slow to rise.thereafter.

It was this problem of

income distribution, rather than substantial overall declines in out
put, that would seem to account for the distress and tensions of the

period.
Why did this occur?

One answer lies in the nature of economic

performance in agriculture and manufacturi ng respectivel y.

The strik

ing change is the slowdown in agricultura l output (in both total pro
duction and value added).

This is due almost entirely to a slowdown

in the growth of total productivit y, since there was only a small de
crease in the rate of growth of total inputs (a weighted average of land,
labor, capital, and current inputs such as seeds and fertilizers ).
Current inputs actually increased, and capital inputs grew at about
the same rate as earlier (though notably not trees as the silk boom
finally ground to a halt).

The growth of arable land area slowed down

considerabl y, and the agrarian labor force actually decreased some
what--but not in substantial numbers until the mid-193O 1 s. 3
Why then did the rate of growth of ngricultura l output per unit
of land, and per worker, slow down so much?
and we do not have definitive answers.

The issue is complex,

Clearly, agrarian price de

clines and the deflationar y policy were important factors. 4
On net balance, price incentives for farmers to produce declined
substantial ly between 1925 and the 1931 low for relevant price in
dices.5

Prices farmers received dropped by 53.4- per cent; of course

non-agricu ltural prices also decreased sharply (the manufacture rs
price index by 46.O per cent and wholesale price index by 42.7 per
c~nt).

The impact on farm real incomes was two-fold: in terms of the

absolute decline, and relative to the decrease in prices of goods pur-
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chased by farmers.
The absolute decline in prices increased the burden of agricul
tural debt in proportion.

Farm debt, as surveyed in 1929, was high,

at 4.59 billion·yen 86.6 per cent greater than value added in agricul
ture that year~
individuals.

6

Most (56.5 per cent) was owed to money_lenders and other
Moreover, the price of land declined substantially, so

that the value of debts relative to asset_s rose substantially.
however, adjusted.

Rents,

In kind (koku of rice per~ of paddy) they actu

ally decreased slightly, and in money terms (for upland fields) they
dropped commensurately.

Moneylenders, but not rentiers, benefitted

from the deflation so long as their borrowers did not go bankrupt.
To a considerable extent the adverse impact on farm real income
of the absolute decline in prices received for agricultural goods sold
was offset by the decrease in prices paid by farmers for goods they
used in production and consumption.

Prices for fertilizer and other

current inputs actually decreased slightly more than prices of agri
cultural output.

However, the rural consumption price index did not

decline as much (32.9 per cent).

The terms of trade did turn somewhat

against agriculture, however measured. 7
This decline in farm prices occurred for a variety of reasons.
One was the government policy to increase imports of cheap rice from
Taiwan ~nd Korea; this bid the price down in Japan.

Liu and Suits

have estimated that "the inclusion of Korea and Formosa in the Japan
ese rice market resulted in the suppression of rice price in Japan by
18 per cent," and thot "a 1 per cent increase in the total rice im-
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ports from the colonies would result in a 1.75 per cent reduction in
the price of rice, 11 and hence that the incentives in the rice market
operated so as to restrict rice output in Japan and encourage it in
the colonies.

8

Second was the general deflationary policy of the gov

ernment until 1931; probably prices were less elastic for agricultural
Third, the slide-off of world prices for

than for manufactured goods.

agricultural goods beginning in the mid-1920 1 s, and particularly (for
Japan) the decline in the price of raw silk, put downward pressure on
Japanese agricultural prices.
The decrease of silk prices by 32 per cent between 1925-1929,
and another third by 1931 had a widespread agrarian impact, since two
fann families out of five relied to some extent upon sericulture as a
source of cash income.

However, the average extent of this adversity

may have been exaggerated.

Sericulture at its maximum (in 1925 and

again in 1929) constituted 19 per cent of total farm production at
current prices; the minimum was 8 per cent in 1934 (when the price
was unusually low).

Suppose we take 1925 as the

11

right 11 base 9 for

the relative price of silk to all agricultural goods (and this is fa
vorable to silk since its price was at a peak) and assume that the price
of silk had declined no more than prices of all agricultural goods
(excluding silk).

The increase in the value of agricultural output

in 1931 would have been about 90 million yen (in 1934-36 constant
prices), or approximately 3 per cent, and in 1934 about 275 million
yen (8 per cent). 10

8.

Presumably the decreases in prices reduced farmer incentives to
produce.

The labor inputs are measured in man-years, so we do not

know whether or not farmers worked fewer man-hours per year.

It ap

pears that they did}l since the proportion of land double-cr0pped ac
tually decreased slightly.
Furthermore, the deflationary conditions in the 1920 1 s and early

1930 1 s slowed the rate of growth in non-farm employment opportunities,
especially in highly productive, large-scale manufacturing, as well as
reducing the rate of growth of demand for agricultural products.
The interwar performance of the manufacturing sector, in terms
of output, was considerably better.

Between 1919-1940, value added

in manufacturing grew at_a 6.0 per cent average annual rate.

Follow

ing a slowdown in the early 1920 1 s, the growth rate accelerated from
a beginning to end year average of 7.0 per cent for 1925-30, to 8.2
per cent for 1930-35, and 11.0 per cent for 1935-40.

While the cotton

textile industry came into full bloom, emanating from the World War I
boom, there was continued diversification of production, particularly
in iron and steel, chemicals and machinery.
in relative importance.

Large firms probably grew

Nonetheless, as late as 1929, for gross out

put in factories of five or more employees as recorded in the census of
manufactures, slightly less than one-third was produced by firms of

500 or more employees, and about 40 per cent came from firms of 5-99
employees.

Firms with four or fewer employees produced from a fourth

to a fifth of total manufacturing output.

9.

As an absorber of labor, the manufacturing sector's performance
was less good.

The population censuses of 1920, 1930, and 1940 pro

vide us the most complete information on the ways in which the econom
ically active population (labor force) was used.

Manufacturing absorbed

only 11 per cent of the increase in labor force in the 1920 1 s, but 74
per cent in the 1930 1 s. 12 The 1920 1 s and early 1930 1 s was a period
of workers looking anywhere for jobs; not until the mid-1930 1 s did
productive jobs become available.

The result was a large swelling of

the labor force in low-productivit y service activities, notably retail
trade and personal services, with correspondingly low incomes.

Indus

trialization and population growth resulted in "surplus labor" spil
ling over from agriculture into the cities.
Even those absorbed into manufacturing between 1920 and 1930 were
hired mainly by small, low-productivit y establishments. 13

Bmployment

in firms of 500 or more workers decreased by 90,000 (15.8 per cent
from the 1920 base) over the decade, a decline from 1927 more than
offsetting earlier increases.

Not until 1933 did employment in such

large firms begin to grow significantly.

Corresponding to this dis

tribution of labor was a large and widening difference in output per
worker and wages per worker relative to firm size. 14

Overall, output

per worker in manufacturing rose absolutely and relative to agricul
ture.

However, the productivity and wages of small manufacturing £inns

were probably faily closely related to those in agriculture.

The large

firms were able to increase capital per worker substantially and to
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take advanta ge of the most ~odern technol ogy, thereby enharte ing out
put per worker .
they did

r6r

This gave them the ability to pay l:iigher wages, which

reasorts Which are not entirel y alear.

tions include :

Partia l explan a

large firms probab ly used more skilled labor; they

wanted to reduce labor turnov er, they used relativ ely more males than
females , they set higher educat ional standar ds for hiring employ ees,
they wanted first pick of employ ees.

The interwa r period was char

acteriz ed by what Ohkawa and Rosovsk y have tenned the "differ ential
structu re"--a widenin g produc tivity and wage gap between the modern
sector compri sing large-s cale indust rial enterp rises (using modern
technol ogy and relativ ely large amounts of capita l per worker) and the
traditi onal sector of small- scale, labor-i ntensiv e units of produc tion
using traditi onal, or less modern , techniq ues of produc tion--t ypified
by agricu lture, many small manufa cturing enterp rises, and certain com
ponents of the service sectors . 15
During the World War I boom, money wages in manufa cturing and
agricu lture rose rapidly , but the cost of living went up at an equal
rate, so that real wages remaine d consta nt.

In 1919, and again in

1921 when the cost of living increas e had halted, money and real wages
increas ed sharply for both skilled and unskill ed labor.

The remain der

of the 1920 1 s and the early 1930 1 s was one of erratic h~t persist ent
and heighte ning deflati on.

The cost of living decreas ed at first

slightl y and then, between 1928 and 1932, sharply .

Money wages also

decline d slightl y during the 1920 1 s, so that real wages were relativ ely
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constant until 1930, and at conaidera bly higher levels than those prior
to 1919.
With the onslaught of the Great Depressio n, the pattern of money
and real wages diverged for skilled and for unskilled labor. 16 For
unskilled labor (typified by female workers in agricultu re and in tex
tiles--wh ose relative wage rates remained very stable--a nd by male
workers in agricultu re) money wages were reduced even more than the
sharp decline in prices, so that real wages dropped by 20 per cent or
more before beginning to rise again in the mid-1930 1 s.

For skilled

labor (typified by male workers in iron and steel and in machinery ),
money wages declined only slightly; real wages actually increased be
tween 1929 and 1933.
unskilled .

Hence, skilled worker wages rose relative to

This, together with the real wage patterns during the 19-

201s, suggests the existence of two distinct labor markets in int~r
war Japan:

skilled and unskilled .

The supply of skilled workers was

not highly elastic nor increasin g more rapidly than increases in de
mand.

Demand for skilled workers grew due to:

the overall growth of

industry; the changing industria l compositi on, particula rly the rise
of such industrie s as machinery , iron and steel, and chemicals , which
required a higher proportio n of skilled workers; and a rising capital/
labor ratio embodying more skill-usin g technolog ies within industrie s.
In contrast, the supply of unskilled workers was highly elastic; in
deed there was an overflow into services.
workers increased only slowly.

Yet demand for unskilled

12.
How do we explain these wage-employ ment-output relationship s1
The World War I boom culminated in a temporary labor shortage, even
for unskilled labor.

As indicated above, the continuing real wage

increases for skilled workers is consonant with demand-supp ly relation
ships for their services.
clear.

For unskilled workers the answers are less

During the 1920's they were not being absorbed into manufactur

ing in sufficient quantities relative to supply to suggest continuing
shortage.
It appears that an important component of the explanation lies in
the downward stickiness of money wages.

For unskilled workers there

was SJme actual decline during the 1920 1 s in money wage rates but it
was resisted, as the rising number of labor disputes, and their causes,
testify.

Not until the 1930-32 depression were finns able to push un

skilled worker money wages down substantial ly. 17

The downward sticki

ness of money wage rates appears to be a common characteris tic of in
dustrial countries, rather than anything which was specific to Japan.
Indeed, in the face of real adversity, the Japanese wage and price
structure was considerabl y more flexible than those in the United King
dom, Germany,, or the United States. 18
My interpretat ion is that all this was produced by a combination
of World War I boom-induce d disequilibr ia, business subsequent defla
tionary expectation s about price movements, and a downward stickiness
of money wages.

The World War I boom was tremendous; it engendered

the most rapid industrial and overall growth Japan had ever had, and
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in the process had resulted in a shortage of industrial labor, high

prices (a doubling of the price level)and high money wages.

It is

likely that temporarily the price of labor relative to capital was
higher than relative stockr:1 of lnbor and cap~· '.:al would d:'.ctate in
equilibrium.

If these relative prices tended to continue, it would

pay firms to substitute capital for labor.

Businessmen realized that

their prices for goods were high and that the pressures of foreign
competition were likely to push prices down.
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies.

They could anticipate
This made it imperative

that ways be found to reduce costs of production.

Moreover; they

probably felt that it -s-ruld be difficult to push money wages down much,
whereas they could (correctly) expect some decrease in the price of
investment goods, especially imported (or import-competi':ive) machin
ery.

Firms hence felt it economical to obtain a more stable labor

force, to train it more as skill requirements increased, and to use
more capital-intensive techniques of production.
Institutional factors were not unimportant.

It was known that

legislation restricting night shift work by women and children would
go into effect in the late 1920 1 s.

This struck particularly hard at

the textile industry, which alone accounted for more than half of fac
tory employment.

Firms respond(.' by "rationalization"; for example,

in cotton spinning the number of operative spindles per worker in
creased from 23 in 1922 (not much differ~:.... !: from prewar) to 42 in 1930

and 53 in 1935.
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The substitution of capital for labor was probably reinforced
by an imperfect capital market in which large firms, and firms affili
ated with large banks, obtained access to funds to finance investment
and at relatively low cost, whereas smaller firms had difficulty bor
rowing and issuing bonds and had to do so at higher cost.

Moreover,

this gap probably also existed in the ability to borrow and absorb
foreign technology.

All of this is tied in with economies of scale.

To the extent that the differential structure results from skill dif
ferentials and market imperfections, it is probably a characteristic
common to all industrializing countries.
In the previous section a continuing motif is the impact of de
flationary pressures culminating in 1931:

on agriculturnl productiv

ity; on the capital/labor ratio in manufacturing (especially in large
firms); hence on output per worker in manufacturing and on the (in)
ability of the manufacturing sector to absorb the growing labor force;
on the persistent high level of real wages due to downward stickiness
of money wages; and consequently

upon the distribution of income.

The

deflationary pressures were essentially a government policy response
to the difficulties, emanating out of World War I, in restoring to
equilibrium the relationship between Japan's domestic economy and its
19
economic activity with the rest of the world.
The basic problem was
that prices in Japan had risen more than they had abroad; once the war
ended, Japan was not able to compete sufficiently in international mar
kets despite the war-induced growth and diversification of industry.

15.
1
These difficultie s manifested themselves in both Japan s balance of

payments -and in:the exchange rate between yen and foreign currencies.
Restoration of internation al equilibrium was the most important eco
nomic issue of the 1920 1 s.
as:

The government saw the essence of the issue

when, and under what conditions, should Japan return to the gold

standard?
The emphasis upon the return to t.he gold standnrd was not some
thing uniquely Japanese.

Irtdeed, it undet:lay the polic:Y: objectives

of all the major industrial countries.~

0

The restoration of a nation's

currency to convertibil ity and with a stable internation al value was
generally regarded as fundamental to an internation al system of multilateral, relatively free trade.

Only by this means could European

recovery be achieved and internation al prosperity assured.

Quite na

turally, given the experience prior to World War I, countries conceived
of such a fixed exchange standard:

convertibil ity of one's currency

was to gold, rather than simply to another country's currency.

Through

out the 1920 1.s the major nations struggled to return to gold, but on
a piecemeal basis without much coordinatio n.

Some--the United King-

dom was archetypica l--returned at a seriously overvalued exchange rate;
others--not ably France--at a seriously undervalued exchange rate.
For Japan World War I was a great boon--an external, exogenous
demand stimulus for Japanese exports and depressant of imports which
had out-compete d domestic producers.

The result was a surge of domes

tic growth, inflation, and a large current account surplus in the bal-
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ance of payments which by 1919 had resulted in a cumulation of foreign
assets in excess of the heavy indebtedness position of 1913.

Most of

the war-related increase in foreign assets was held by the government
and the central bank (the Bank of Japan)~

Accordingly the money supply

had virtually tripled, enabling prices to rise sharply despite goveth.-··
ment budget surpluses between 1914 artd 1919.

We do hot have solid data

for all types of capital flows; the informE\tion on non.i.gc:·rvernmental
short-term capital flows is particulariy weak.

Nonetheless, the rough

estimates of Table 2 provide adequate indication of the major., shifts·
in the total long-term indebtedness, in foreign exchange reserves, and
in certain of the specific items.
plus (re Table 3

21

Japan used its current account sur

)to increase its own loans and investments in China,

to help Britain, France, and Russia 22 , and to build up its foreign ex
change reserves while not paying off its own foreign borrowings in ad
vance to an¥ substantial extent.
Japan ended the war in the strongest foreign exchange reserve po
sition in its history.
imports.

Reserves were equivalent to about 10 months 1 ·

Most were held abroad, 23 but Japan had also imported substan

tial gold for reserve purposes until September 1917, when the United
States embargoed gold exports (England had gone off the gold standard
earlier).

Japan thereupon also went off the gold standard, which me!Ult

that the government and Bank of Japan refused to sell gold or allow it
to leave the country.

However, the government and Bank of Japan bought

up the foreign exchange balances accruing to Japanese banks financing

17.
Table 2
Japanese Balance of International Indebtedness
Exclusive of Short-Term Capital
(rough estimates in million yen)
1913

1919

1929

2,070

1,822

2,5l~9

1,970
100

1,722
100

2,304
245

529

1,850

1,676

61
55

975
417
557

Japanese Direct Investment

468

875

China
South Manchuria Railway

278
100

(600)
100

(750)
391

-1,Sl~l

28

-873

376

2, ot.,5

1,343

-1, 165

2,073

470

Japanese Long-Term Liabilities
Borrowing from Abroad
Foreign Direct Investment in Japan
Japanese Long-Term Assets
Loans to Abroad
China
Allies

Net Long-Term Position
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Net Position Excluding Short-Term
Balances

245
244a
a
1,431

~xcluded are defaulted loans of 27 million yen to the Chinese govern
ment and 2M million yen to czarist Russia. The direct investment
estimates are crude, particularly Japanese investment in China,
which for 1919 and 1929 are no more than orders of magnitude. For
China the distinction between loans and direct investment is some
what arbitrary.
Source:

Derived from Harold
Financial Appraisal
1931), pp. 390-l~03;
of Japanese Economy

G. Houlton, Japan, An Economic and
(Washington: Brookings Institution,
Bank of Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics
(Tokyo: 1966).
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Table 3
Summary Balance of Payments of the Japanese Empire 1
(in million yen)

I.

II.

III.

Balance on Current
Accounta

19141919

-lll,2. 4

3035 .o

-

1921

1922

1923

19201923

79.3

-246.2

-181.5

-447.9

- 954. 9

1920

1.

Trade Balance

-

706.5

1197.5

-500 .1

-l,l,2. 0

-336.1

-617.7

-1895. 9

2.

Invisible
Balance

- l,35. 9

1837.5

420.8

il.95.8

154.6

169.8

941.0

167.7

1700.7

126.7

- 74.7

-233.5

-171.1

- 357 .6

59. 7

603,8

407.5

132.5

1.1

227.4

1096.9

-280.8

-207. 2

-1310.1

1334.3

li-7,l,

-171.5

Changes in Foreign
Exchange
3.

Gold Flows

4.

Balances Held
Abroad

Other Capital
Flowsc
5.
6,

IV.

19081913

-

-

0.1

5ia.o

-239.6

-171,0

- 898,6

5 7 .0

-276.8

- 597. 3

Long-Term
Short-Term

Errors and
Ommissionsd
(I-II-III)
1

Japan Proper, Taiwan, Korea, South Sea Mandated Islands.

aMinus indicates net inflow.
bMinus indicates net decrease of reserves and outflow of gold.
cMinus indicates net inflow of capital,
d

Where information not available, assumed to be fully in (short-term) capital
account.
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Table 3 (continue d)

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Balance on Current
Accounta
1.

Trade Balance

2.

Invisible
Balance

192l}

1925

-565. 6

1927

1928

-202.1

-302. 5

-141.1

-172.7

19.0

-1365 .o

-729.8

-357.0

-442.5

-209.0

-333.9

-168.3

-2320,5

164.2

154. 9

140.0

ll,.7. 9

161. 2

187.3

955 .s

71. 6

14lt.O

0.4

0.5

-·-

1929

Changes in Foreign
Exchange Reservesb

-118.5

-

90 .o

- 59.8

- 80.0

3.

Gold Flows

0

-

22.0

- 31.8

- 36.0

l} •

Balances Held
.II.broad

-118.5

-

68.0

-

- 44.0

-

72.0

143.5

Other Capital
Flowsc

-447.1

-112.1

-2l}2. 7

-

2, lt

- 44.6

Long-Term

-238.0

-

-

- 86.5

5.

36.9

+126.2

- 53.l:-

52.8

6.

Short-Ter m

-209.1

- 48,2

-205.8

-128.6

8.8

-139.3

- 58. 7

- 56.5

Errors andd
Ommissions

19241929

1926

63.9

28.0

-

-

38.5

-

-

276.7

- 88.8

-

187. 9

-1088. 3

-

213.2
875 .1
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Table 3 (continued)

I.

II.

III.

IV.

1930

1931

19301931

- 27.3

- 5 7 .5

- 84.8

43.3

31. 9

62.9

-160. 3

-ll,1.1

-301. lf

- 58.8

- 77. 9

-129.3

133.0

83.6

216.6

102.1

109.8

192.2

Changes in Foreign
Exchange Reservesb

-383.0

-li03,0

-786.0

-

3.0

- 59.0

0

3.

Gold Flows

-286,8

-388. 2

-675.0

-112 .1

- 20. 9

0

lf.

Balances Held
..i\broad

- 96. 2

-

14.8

-111.0

109.1

- 38.1

0

319.7

328.7

720. l,

127.8

152,5

Balance on Current
Accounta
1.

Trade Balance

2.

Invisible
Balance

Other Capital
.
C
Flows

:1932

1933

1934

-

2.9

5,

Long-Term

92,0

233.9

325. 9

167.8

41.0

233.2

6,

Short-Term

227.7

94.8

494.5

- 40.0

111.5

-226.1

- 36.0

16.8

- 19.2

-174.1

-179.6

- 65. 8

Errors andd
Ommissions
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Table 3 (continued)

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Balance on Current
Accounta

1935

1936

1937

19321937

310.1

131.0

- 653.0

73.8

1.

Trade Balance

131.8

-101.9

- 635 .o

- 871.1

2.

Invisible
Balance

178.3

232.9

18.0

797.3

Changes in Foreign
E~::change Reservesb

36.0

l~6 .0

-1220.1

-1200.1

3.

Gold Flows

l}.

Balances Held
Abroad

0.1

0

- 866.9

- 999,8

35. 9

l}6. 0

- 353. 2

- 200.3

Other Capital
Flowsc

245. 8

130. 7

567.1

1221.0

5.

Long-Term

454.6

226.6

567.1

1123. 2

6.

Short-Term

-208.8

Errors andd
Ornmissions

Note:

28.3

-

95. 9

97.8

- 45. 7

1937 capital and foreign exchange data are not fully compar
able Hith previous years; "balances held abroad II might
equally well be classified under short-term capital flows.

Source:

E. B. Schumpeter, ed. The Industrializati on of Japan and
Manchukuo 1930-1940, Appendix Table III; Ninistry of
Finance, Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo, No. 5 (May 1950).
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exports, in effect pegging the exchange rate at close to the gold standard par (100 yen equal to $49.85).

24

What did Japan need tQ return to the golf standard at a partic
ular par rate?

The most important requisite was sufficiently competi

tive export strength, in terms of domestic prices converted into inter
national prices at the target exchange rate, to be able to pay for im
ports (given capital flows) commensurate with a desired or expected
rate of growth of GNP.

Moreover, Japan needed sufficient foreign ex

change reserves to be nble to combat any immediate or eventual tempor
ary situation of excess demand for foreign exchange over supply.

Re

lated to this, the government had to inspire confidence that the ex
change rate and the timing were correct in order not to provoke adverse
speculation.

An additional concern was to have adequate gold backing,

held in Japan, for the Bank of Japan paper currency in circulation. 25
The Japanese government was astounded at the bold United States
move to return (in June 1919) to the gold standard, (at the prewar
par) rather soon after the war ended.

It moved much more cautiously,

and for good reasons.
The immediate reason was the speculative bubble of late 1919 and
early 1920 which burst in March 1920.

Businessmen had expected prices

of goods to continue to rise; since anything could be sold at a pro
fit it was delivery, not price, that became important.

This spread

from the commodities market into the stock market, where a speculative
mania erupted.

It also spilled over into foreign trade, with a big

23.
upsurge of ';nports leading to a current account deficit.

This in turn

produced an automatic contraction of the domestic money supply.

The

bubble burst from the combined impact of cheap imports and tighter
money.

The downturn was sharp.

Wholesale prices, which had gone from

200.3 (1913 = 100) in May 1919 to 321.5 by March 1920, declined pre~
cipitousJ.y to 247.7 by June, and continued to slide off to a low 189.8
in April 1921 when the government's counter-recession policies took
hold.

For there was indeed a recession, in Japan and worldwide-·~the

downturn in England and the United States did not begin until summer
1920 &nd continued longer than in Japan.
Another immediate, and pervasive, reason was highly political.
Although government bureaucrats in 1919 favored an early return to the
gold standard, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi rejected it on the
grounds that it would probably result in a gold outflow from Japan
~nd Japan needed the gold for expansion into China.
investment in railroads and industry.

If Japan did not lend China the

funds, England and the United States would.
able to dominate China.

China needed

Whoever did so would be

Inouye, then president of the Bank of Japan,

3upported Takahashi's position.

26

The government was too caught up in its immediate problems, and
the uncertainties which they engendered, to move tow,'.lrd quick re-e.s
tgblishment of the gold standard at the prewar par.

problem was more serious:

The underlying

during World War I Japan's prices had ri.sen

more than, and in the 1920-21 recession did not decline nearly as much

24.
as, its competitors in world markets (see Table 4).

At the prewar par

exchange rate, at about which the actual rate continued due to govern
ment pegging, Japanese exports were too expensive and foreign imports
too cheap.

The consequence was inevitable:

the currect acccount of

the balance of payments moved from surplus to deficit.
What policy alternatives were available to Japan to restore equi
librium in its balance of payments?

The fundamental problem under such

circumstances is to obtain and maintain a balance between docestic
world price levels.

and

One method is to let domestic prices go their own

way (to achieve domestic goals) and to achieve international equilibri
um by a fluctuating exchange rate.

Aside from some adverse effects on

foreign traders by increasing uncertainty, this approach was the anti
thesis of the objective to return to the gold standard (fixed exchange
rate) system.

Under such a system the only way to adjust to world pri

ces is to change the domestic price level.

Here there were two choices:

to return at the prewar gold value of yen, or to establish a new value.
For Japan, the fonner meant a deflationary policy sufficient to get
domestic prices in line with (declining) world prices, the latter meant
devaluation--setting a new parity, less yen to the dollar and pound-
such that domestic deflation would not be necessary. 2 7
But devaluation was not considered a really suitable alternative
for major, advanced countries--in the 1920 1 s even more than today.

A

country had to bear its burden, swallow its medicine, and do the right
thing.

After all, look how England fought stubbornly and valiantly to

25.
get back to the gold standard at the ordained par--even if domestic
deflation did mean 10 per cent unemployment and it did take until 1925.
Apparently devaluation--returning to the gold standard at a new, low
er par--was never con&idered seriously by Japanese policymakers in the
1920 1 s.

The only choice was to push prices down at home.

(We must

remember that in the 1920 1 s it was not well understood that an impor
tant part of this adjustment process was not just prices but the slow
ing of economic growth.)
There were other ways in which Japan could at least mitigate the
fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of payments.
restrict import demand by raising tariffs. 28

One was to

Another was to return

to a pattern of net foreign borrowing, which after all had successfully
shored up the gold standard before World War I.

In the first instance

this would simply involve the drawing of accumulated foreign exchange
reserves, but eventually would necessitate substantial long-term bor
rowing.

Given its income level and growth potential, there is no

reason why Japan should not have been a net borrower.
During the 1920's Japan tried all these methods, in concert and
sequentially:

exchange rate fluctuation and thereby depreciation,

deflation, increases in tariffs, using up of foreign exchange reserves
and renewed foreign borrowing, and finally, return to the gold stan
dard at the prewar par.

But no policies were pushed long and hard

enough until 1929--they were palliatives reflecting a fundamental in
decisiveness at the highest policy level.

I believe this was a basic

j
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Tablt! 4: : Wholesale Prices, Tenns of Trade, and

the Foreign Exchange Rate '
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Wholesale Price Index
..
•
Adjusted for
Changes
in th~
: Terms
United
United
Exchange · ' of
Kingdom· States
Ratea
Japan
'rrade ·
(Japan)·
"•

;•

· Year

1913

.:.··>:?,.: 1914

95.6
118.3
1.50,3
'2'00,3
241_.9

220.8
139.9
138,9
143, 9 .
140.8

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

159,0.
147.9
141.9
140.0
137.0

147.9
142.9
137. o,
139,9
137.9

201.7
.. 178.7
169.8
170.9
166.1

·1930
1931
. 1932
1933.

119.9
105.2
102.6
102.7
105.6

125.1
105.7
93.8
. 95.4
· 108.4

,>j \:·It. :'.

:'1936
.;'--' .,,.• '.··, 1937

;·ttlt(mi

1

•

....

96.6
116.8
. 147.0
192,5
235,9.

,.,..

307.0
197.0
159,0
159.0
166.0

j . · ··-;,., .· · 1935

,.,._••,i '
· ;.

100.0
95.3

1920
1921.
1922
'·. 1923 ·
1924

.

-~: l

100.0
95.5

127.0
160.0
·. 206.0
226.0
242.0

1934 .

~

100.0
97.9

·. 1915
1916
1917
·. 1918
1919

l;_ /-if .
1

100.0
100.0

.

'

106.7
113.3
130.4
. : 121.6
123.3

100.0
122.9
167.2
/187 .9
198.9

259.3- · · 260.6
200.3
194.7
195.8
189.9
199,2
197.2
206.5
175. 7
•,

100.0
·: · 94.3

: •··i .
:.•,

. .,

'

90. 5 .
98.5
94.5
82.3
99,9

98,1
142.0
134.2
: 136.6
.117.7

166.5
169.7
162.9
160.9
155,0

108.2
; 109. 3
117,5
105.5
106.6

136,7
115,6
128.2
147.0
149.8

136,7
114.4
73,0
. 75.1
89,5·

98.6
100.6
84.6
. 77 .6
67.4

115.7 ·.' 153·, 7
160.1
117.0
150,5 . · 194. 4
13·(. O . 205. O
111.6
226.6

88.9
93.9
113.4
118.3
119.3

,. 62.7
65.6
64.1
68.4
81.9

·'

Average Foreign
Exchange Rate
1oo·yeill yen/shilling

49.375
49.500

2t-1/2
2/-1/4

48.875
50.000
50.500
51.375
50.625

2/-9/16
2/10 1/4
2/10 9/16
2/10 15/16
2/3-

49.625
48.ooo
47.875
48.875
42.000.

2/7 1/2
2/5 7/8
2/1 3/4
2/1 9/16
1/10 13/16

40.750
46.875
47.375
46.500
46.070

1/8 1/4
1/11 1/8
1/11 7/16 ·
1/10 7/8
1/10.755

49.367
48.871
28.120
g5.227
29.511

2/0.3112
2/1.947
1/7.157
1/2.409 .·
1/2.069

28.570
28.951
28.813
28.496
25.984

1/21/21/21/21/2.054

•'

r

·-

°wholesale ·price index multiplied.by average· exchange rate in dollars,
Bank of Jap~n, Hundred-Year Statistics; Ohkawa et al., Pricesi.Vol. 8,
LTES.
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cause of the malaise of the 1920 1 s.

Before turning to a discussion

of the deflationary approach, I trace briefly the use of other policy
measures.
Japan had sharply depreciating and then again rising exchange rate
between March 1924 and mid-1926 not because of a deliberate government
policy but because the government could no longer maintain the pegged
rate neav parity.

The basic reason was a persistent current account

deficit which ate up foreign exchange reserves; the pegged rate simply
could not be maintained indefinitely.
tant immediate cause:
1923.

There was also a highly impor

the Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake of September 1,

The destruction was great; quick reconstruction required a large

amount of imports over and above regular needs.

Exports were needed

at home; moreover, substantial productive capacity had been destroyed
or rendered inoperative.

The trade deficit worsened sharply.

Successive

governments insisted that the exchange would remain pegged, but it
began to slip in New York.

A divergence between New York and Tokyo

rates could not be maintained; finally on March 18, 1924 the government had to abandon pegging and allow the rate to find a market-deter
mined level.

The rate dropped sharply, to a low $38.50 per 100 yen

by year-end, a decline of 22 per cent.

The trade balance responded

favorably; the demand for imports slowed down and exports increased.
The improvement in the trade balance, an increased receptivity
in foreign capital markets to Japanese borrowing, and a policy decision
to ship government gold out all tended to raise the exchange rate in
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1925.

To this was added a speculative element.

ly speculated against the yen

Those who had previous

now speculated in its favor because of

the more favorable underlying factors plus renewed expectation that the
29
government would support the parity rate.
Thereafter the foreign exchange rate meandered between $44-49, rising fairly sharply from this
lower level in the second half of 1929 when Japan had finally determined
to return to the gold standard at prewar parity.
Tariff policy was also used to restrict imports, but for protection~
ist as much as balance of payments reasons.

Certain World War I growth

industries, such as chemicals and iron and steel, which were not yet
fully competitive against imports, obtained increased tariff protection
in 1920.

The Great Earthquake quite naturally was an occasion for the

imposition of 100 per cent ad valorem duties on some 120 luxury items
(primarily manufactured consumer goods).

In 1926 there was a complete

revision of tariffs, thereby embodying and formalizing principles which
were already in operation.

Industrial raw materials were duty free;

this increased the effective tariff protection of manufactured goods
and made their export more competitive.

Some important infant industries-

iron and steel, sugar, copper, dyestuffs, woolen textiles--were protec
ted, though engineering was not particularly.

High duties continued on

the luxuries. 30
In addition to the apparently rather large amount of short-term
capital, speculative in part at least, which flowed into Japan between
1920-1929, Japan wae a net gorrower on long-term.

The national govern-
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ment was only a sporadic borrower:

229 million yen (e25 million 6 per

cent 35-year bonds issued at 87~, $150 million 6~ per cent 40-year bonds
issued at 92~) in February 1924 to redeem sterling loans falling due
and for earthquake reconstruction; and 102.5 million yen (bl2.5 million
5~ per cent 35-year bonds issued at 90 and $71 million 5~ per cent 35year bonds issued at 90) in May 1930 to redeem sterling bonds falling
due between July 1930-January 1931.

In addition, government outstand

ing domestic bonds were purchased by foreigners, especially when the
exchange rate was low.

Municipalities sold some bonds abroad, but the

main long-term issues abroad were of industrial debentures, notably by
Japanese electric power firms.
The balance of payments data in Table 3 are net estimates, while
Japan's gross foreign capital needs were somewhat larger, in order to
finance Japanese lending and investment abroad.

From the rough esti

mates of Table 2, it appears that Japan's long-term assets increased
only moderately between 1919 and 1929, from 1,850 million yen to 2,187
million yen (including 511 million yen in bad debts).
Overall Japan was not able, or did not try hard enough, to borrow
sufficient long-term capital to finance more than a small fraction 31
of its current account deficit.
up foreign exchange reserves.

The immediate alternative was to use
The longer-run solution lay only in re

storation of export competitiveness by domestic deflation.
The indecisiveness in deflationary policy during the decade of the
1920 1 s was, to my mind, a fatal weaknes£.

If it had to be done at all--
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and clearly a preferable policy would have been to de-value and there
by return to the gold standard at a lower par soon after World War I
(say in 1921 or 1922), or certainly after the excuse provided by the
Great Earthquake--deflation should have been more swift and severe.
The 20 per cent decline in 1921 from the 1S20 average wholesale price
level was not enough; perhaps as much as another 20 per cent would have
been required.

Such a policy would have ruined many more firms, caused

the collapse of many more banks, and probably led to really severe dis
ruption of the economy, but at least it would have cleared the slate
for a renewed emphasis on growth.

On the other hand, erratic doses

of deflation, countered by renewed counter-deflationary expansion of
demand through fiscal and especially monetary policy, was essentially
debilitating.

The problem with the former, more drastic approach is

like that of major surgery:

the operation may be a success bu: the

patient may die,
Why didn't the government ever really push through a fully effec
tive deflationary policy until 1929?

The main reason seems to lie in

a series of minor economic crises emanating from a variety of exoge
nous and endogenous sources:

the Great Earthquake, shifts in foreign

demand due to the world business cycle, the domestic speculative mania
of 1919-1920, the banking syste~ crisis of 1927, the deflationary pol
icy itself.

In all these instances difficulties were exacerbated by

the inherent weakness of the domestic financial system.

In order to

prevent the system from collapsing, at the first (or eventual) signs

31.

of trouble the Bank of Japan had to rush in and pump· in liquidity.
This inevitably undercut the deflationary policy.
Why, and in what ways, did the difficulties in the economy show
up in the financial sector?

First, the financial system in most market

economies is the usual intermediary of a tight or easy monetary policy,
spreading its effects to producers and distributors by shifts in its
willingness and ability to lend.

On the whole, the evolving Japanese

banking system had demonstrated its ability to assist in the financing
of economic growth when things were going well--when funds were avail
able and business wanted to borrow for investment purposes.
the development of the banking system prior to 32

Indeed

and during World War

I had been highly responsive to the types of financing needed for growth,
rather than adopting the inhibiting rules of, say, British commercial
banking.
However, Japan's banking system was not well constructed to with
stand the pressures of recessions, of deflation, or of sporadic ran
dom shocks.

The deficiencies of the system can be summed up in three

interrelated characteristics :

there were a large number of small,

unit banks; many banks tended to concentrate risk of default by lend
ers, rather than diversifying it, by making large loans (relative to
net worth) to a few borrowers; and depositors had no guaranteed means
of protection.
While the number of ordinary (commercial) banks had declined from
the peak of l81H in 1901, many remained at the end of World War I (see

32.
Table 5).

Although there were a number of banks of intermediate size,

in essence there were two groups:

a small number (epitomized by the

"Big Five") of very large banks located in the major cities, notably
Tokyo and Osaka; and a large number of quite small banks located in
smaller towns as well as the larger cities.

The government, in princi

ple, did not allow new banks to be established during the interwar
period.

It encouraged the reduction in total number by merger among

small, weak banks in the same locality.

Mergers often did not help

much, being only an amalgamation of dubious assets,

The decline in

total bank net worth attests to the necessary writing down of reserves
and capital upon merger,

The occasional crises forced many small banks

to fail; they usually would be absorbed by larger banks.

In this way

there was some increase in the number of branch offices of the large
city banks, though still moderate until the 1930 1 s.

The amalgamation

of banks from 1925 on led to a reduction in the total number of bank
offices,

The apparent decline in service to the population was compen

sated, in part at least, by the increasing urbanization ..
Many of the banks--both large and small--were owned and controlled
by stockholders who also had industrial interests.

These banks, and

others as well, tended to lend a high proportion of their funds to these
related business interests--to help their growth in good times and pre
vent, if necessary, their bankruptcy in bad times.

There were no re

strictions on the maximum size of a loan in relation to a bank's worth,
and bank inspection did not become a significant factor until after the

, '
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-..Table ·5: .Gro'.rth of. Ordinary Banks, 1919-1938
··-..

Number-of Bank Offices
Head
Branches. Total
Office

Year

1,340
1,322
1,327
1,794
1,698

1919
1920
1921

1922
1923
1924.

1,626

1,534
1,417
1,280

1925

1926
i9t?7
1928.
1929,

. 1_,028

878

2,540
. 2,772
3,129
5,122 5,239
5,288

3,880
4,094
·4,456
6,916
6,937
6,914

6,320
5;297
5,218
5,044
4,917

··-1,000
People
per
Bank
Office
111,27

680
538
516
', 484

1935
1936

466
424

779

1937

377

346

1938
Note:

4,763

878

13.66

1,211

12,71

1,364
1,918

655,2
916.0
1027,9
1069,1
1184,3
1273,7

:8,29
8.41
8.51

. 2,071

7,854
6,714
6,498
6,072
5,795

7,61
9,01
9,44
10.23
10.86

2,114 1378,1
2 ,1li6 , 1443,9
.,2,097 1638,3
1~963 1909,5
1,976 2250.6,

5,542

)

1930
1931
1932
.1933
, 1934

Average
Net
Net
Worth
· Worth
(million . (1,000
yen)
yen)

2,011

4,542
4,311
4,021
. 3,893

11.63
12.52
13.67
14.82
15.58

1,878

2410.8

5,222
4,849
4,537
4,377

1,776
1,747
1,702

26ll.8
3247,2
3296,5
3516.5

3,708

3,654
3,621

4,174
4,078
3,998

3,600

3 ,9li6

16.59
17,23
l7,82
18,30

1,698
1,685
1,644
1,646

3643~8
3974.1
4360.7
4757.2

1,701

Deposits
(million
yen)

Loans
and Ad-.
vances
(million
yen)

5, 74)~
5,826
· 6 ,44)~
7,801
7,805
8,093

5,666
5,902
6,242
7,848
"8,059
8,289

8,726
9,178
9,027
9,330_ ·,
9 ,29~ .

8,738

8,842
9,219
8,180,
7,545
7,246·

6,818

8,269
8,319
8,815
. 9,438

6,594
6,31{3
6,085
5,987

9,950

6,193
6,765
1,193
8 ,81}8

11,007

12,434
15,191

The large increase in ordinary banks in 1922 was due to changes in the
Savings Bank Law whereby many institutions found it desirable to alter
their status,

Sources:

Bank of. Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics; .Ohkawa et al.~ The Growth Rate
of the Japanese Economy.
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panic of 1927.

Many banks had aggressive growth aims.

Not only did they,

expand loans to affiliated borrowers, they would borrow funds in the
call market to do so.

This made them even more vulnerable to adversity,

since other financial institutions making call loans might well refuse
to continue their loans to the bank.
Depositors were attracted to a bank by its conveeience of location,
deposit interest rate, and degree of safety.

The larger banks did not

have many offices, so it often was not convenient to deposit with them.
A wise man would withdraw his deposit in currency if he thought his
bank might somehow be in, or on the verge of, trouble.

There was no

deposit insurance against default by the bank due to its inability to
cash in deposits for currency.
The system was made for panic-stricken bank runs.
bank was heavily loaned up, holding small reserves.

An individual

It was subject

to insolvency (having to close its doors--refusing to provide currency
for deposits) either because of a depositor run or difficulties of one
of its major borrowers.

A major borrower could either be in temporary

straits (fundamentally sound but in a liquidity crisis because, for ex
ample, a buyer might delay in paying his bill) or bankrupt (assets less
than liabilities).

The bank would have to lend to this borrower or

else face the likelihood of its loan being defaulted.

News of the

business's difficulty might get out; people, knowing of its close re
lationship with the bank, would fear for the safety of their deposits
and hurry to withdraw them.

Or the bank and its borrowers might be in
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perfectly sound condition, but a run might have started on another small
I

bank in town and depositors, becoming generally apprehensive, would de
cide to withdraw.
These shifts in liquidity preference happen rapidly, and spread
rapidly and cumulatively, in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
No single bank can afford to hold currency in its vaults sufficient to
meet a sudden, large-scale demand to pay off its depositors.

It must

receive currency from other banks--larger banks with which it has a
correspondent or other relationship, ultimately from the Bank of Japan
as central bank.
Several problems exist.
of timing:

One is simply the technical difficulty

in having delivery of currency made before the bank subject

to the run runs out.

The bank might close its doors for a few hours or

days, but at the price of reducing its future creditability.
serious problem is to obtain the loan of currency.

The more

The financial in

stitution lending to it wants sound collateral, not the bad or risky
debts of affiliated, small enterprises.

Moreover, the large banks were

perhaps not so sorry to see runs occur, so long as the runs were of
minor proportions and did not affect them.

After all, depositors at the

small banks under pressure didn't simply hold the cash they had with
drawn; they deposited in the large bank.

Moreover, the small banks would

be forced into amalgamation with the large banks on terms favorable to
the latter.
The system hence was intrinsically subject to failures of individual
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banks and to cepositor runs on the banks.

Public loss of confidence

in banks disrupts the economy, making it difficult to finance economic
activity.

The B,mk of Japan and government were well aware of this.

Whenever a panic got underway, they stepped in quickly to avert its
spread.
The monetary authorities were impaled upon the horns of a dilem
ma.

The basic policy was to restrict central bank credit and money

supply enough to reduce prices sufficientl y to restore balance of pay
ments equilibrium .

But equally basic was a determinati on to prevent

widespread financial panics.

The relief measures inevitably involved

central bank loans, by direct or indirect routes, to affected banks
and business enterprises .
ably increased.

Money supply, particularl y currency, inevit

This directly undercut the deflationar y policy and

made it necessary, once the crisis was over, to have an even stiffer
deflationar y policy.
Data on the net change in Bank of Japan credit during the 1920 1 s
are presented in Table 6.

It did not significant ly contract absolute

ly until 1929-1931; since the economy was growing the net impact was
deflationar y (as evidenced by the decline in wholesale prices in Table
4).

Money supply had a very slightly declining trend during the 1920 1 s

before dropping off sharply in 1930 and 1931; to some extent this was
offset by an increase in income velocity. 33

The persisting deficit in

the current account of the balance of payments, together with the con
tinued loss of foreign exchange reserves, indicates that the deflation
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Table 6
Increases in Bank of Japan Credit (million yen)

Year

1909-1913
1914-1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936

To
Government

28
-2123
431
91
478
27
246
279
154
- 15
236
- 148
159
212
75
165
66
85
229

To Private Sector
Total

Loans

Other

- 139
1,551
- 678
91
- 227
289
- 168
- 220
- 156
208
- 107,
- 94
19
85
- 168
12
17
18
- 176

1
559
-481
139
176
303
-130
- 26

-138
992
-197
- 48
-403
- 14
- 38
-194

-llO

- !i6

306
- 44
-169
74
210
-192
84
21

- 98
- 63
75
- 55
-125
24
- 72
- 4

- 35
- 97

53
- 79

To Finance Gold and
Other Reservesa

168
1,701
127
- 75
- 239
171
- 119
- 90
- 60
- 80
- 72
144
- 383
- 403
3
- 59
0
36
46

Totalb

57
1,129
- 116
107
12
145
- 41
- 31
·- 62
113
57
- 98
- 205
- 106
96
118
83
139
99

a:

Foreign exchange reserves are here consolidated to the Bank of Japan so that
credit to the government was for domestic purposes. The changes in credit
for foreign exchange reserves (the mirror image of changes in reserves them
selves) had their impact directly on the private sector.

b:

Equivalent to changes in Bank of Japan currency issue outstanding.

Sources:

Bank of Japan, Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy; data
on foreign exchange reserves from Table 3,

38.
was not sufficient until 1929-1930--at which point the Great Depres
sion completely changed the game and its rules.
A serious problem of a deflation is that it creates large amounts
of bad debts.

A financial crisis does so, too.

The purpose is to

encourage greater efficiency in given uses of resources, to reallocate
resources to more efficient uses, and to squeeze out inefficient users.
However, it is not clear that deflation does not penalize firms which
may simply be illiquid (because of rapid growth, or descrimination in
credit markets, or small size) rather than basically inefficient.
Certainly there is no clear evidence that the incidence of financial
crisis falls more heavily on the inefficient and the uncompetitive than
on others who are unlucky in location, in financing connections, in
liquidity position.

It is a tricky operation to estimate what is really

bad debt in the sense that underlying assets have a lower value than
liabilities, both immediately and even if the economy were growing.
Neither severe deflation nor inflation are good allocators of resources;
moreover, both have undesirable income distribution effects.
The Bank of Japan's greatest success in the 1920 1 s was in over
coming the potential financial chaos which the Great Earthquake engen
dered by destroying not only housing and businesses but by putting
the Tokyo financial system out of operation.

The Bank of Japan immed

iately agreed to provide virtually unlimited loans to affected banks,
and thus businesses, by discounting commercial paper which came to be
34
known as "earthquake bills."
The government guaranteed the B.nnk of
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Japan against loss to 100 million yen, in effect absorbing part of any
eventual net loss from inability of business borrowers to repay.
There was a feeling during the 1920's that somehow the bad debts
from the excesses of the World War I boom had never been written off,
and to them had been added bad debts in the form of the remaining earth
quake bills for which there were no underlying assets, as well as a
cumulation of bad debts from each successive financial crisis.
how all this had to be cleaned up.

Some-

One proposal in early 1927 was that

the government go ahead and provide financial aid to buy up and write off
the outstanding earthquake bills rather than extend their life by another
year.

In the course of public discussion it became known that certain

large banks, notably the Bank of Taiwan and the Fifteenth (Peers) Bank,
which held earthquake bills, appeared in unsound condition due to hav
ing large loans outstanding to borrowers who appeared unable to pay.
A monetary panic ensued in the spring of 1927.
larger proportions than had ever occurred before.

It was of much
Not just small banks

were involved, but large banks of impeccable credentials.

At the core

of the scandal was the BEnk of Taiwan, a semi-official bank of the
government with power of banknote issue for Taiwan.
The Bank of Taiwan was an extreme case of a higly growth-oriented
financial institution, willing to incur high risks in gambling on con
tinued prosperity of the Japanese economy and especially its major
borrowers.

Earlier in the 1920 1 s it had decided to expand aggressively

by lending in Japan rather than restricting its operations to Taiwan.
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It lent especially to the rapidly growing Suzuki conglomerate, which.
was based on extensive commercial interests in and with Taiwan, but which
sought further growth in undertaking various manufacturing activities in
Japan.

While deposits at the Bank had been at the level of its loans

during World War I, from 1919 on deposits declined sharply to only 23
per cent of the 1918 peak in 1926, and less in 1927.
expanded by 66 per cent over the same period.

In contrast, loans

This loan expansion was

financed primarily by call loans to the Bank of Taiwan from large banks
in Japan.
In early 1927 it appeared possible that Suzuki was overextended.
Not only could it not repay loans, but some of its operations had liabil
ities

greater than assets--the collateral for a portion of its loans

was worthless, even though termed "earthquake bills."
call funds to the Bank of Taiwan recalled them.

The banks lending

The Bank of Japan was

unwilling to extend emergency loans without government guarantee against
losses due to accepting worthless collateral.

This took time, and po

litical machinations in the Diet were disruptive.

The Bank of Taiwan,

the Fifteenth Bank, and other banks, large and small, had to close their
doors.

The run was on.

Public fear this time was not restricted to a particular local
ity, or to small banks.

Everyone wanted cash.

The Bank of Japan re

sponded valiantly, increasing its loans from 539 million to 1484 mil
lion yen in a few weeks; correspondingly, Bank of Japan currency in
circulation rose by 50 per cent.

But even this was not enough.

A
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three week bank moratoriu m was declared on April 22, 1927.
failed.

Many banks

Others, including the Fifteenth , had to be merged.

The extent of the financial crisis of 1927 severely frightene d the
monetary authoriti es; they haven't gotten over it yet.

They determine d

to press ahead with the eliminati on of as many of the small banks as
possible by merger with each other or with larger banks.

A new banking

act, raising the minimum capital requireme nt and making possible great
er supervisi on, was passed in 1927.

As Table 5 indicates , the number

of banks dropped sharply after 1927, and average net worth per bank
increased as sharply.

It had been decided that the way to strengthe n

the system was to centraliz e it, to eliminate the presumabl y weakest
elements.
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In this way the Bank of Japan could more readily step in

and help individua l banks in times of crisis, and thereby prevent the
developme nt of panics.

Nothing was done, however, to insure deposits

for the benefit of depositor s, or to restrict the proportio n of loans
(relative , say, to net worth) of a single bank going to single firm or
group of interrela ted firms.
The Bank of Japan was not alone in trying to stem the chronic
financial instabili ty of the 1920's.

The governmen t took a vigorous

role, not just in guarantee ing at times the financial system against
losses due to default on discounte d paper, but also in its own lend
ing activitie s.

It used the governmen t-dominate d special long-term

credit banks, notably the Industria l Bank and Hypothec Bank, to extend
relief loans in emergenc ies.

These loans came essential ly from funds
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amassed by the Ministry of Finance's Deposit Bureau through postal sav
ings, government bond issue, and government budgetary surpluses.

Such

loans constituted an important component of the relief packages put to
gether when panics occurred,

For example, in the 1920 crLsis as much as

40 per cent of the Industrial Bank's loans were for the relief of large
.
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enterprises.

While there undoubtedly was a bias in the government's

relief programs in favor of big business, some loans were made to smal
ler firms, particularly in the 1927 debacle.
In part because monetary policy was pre-occupied with the instabil
ity of the financial system, fiscal measures were importantly relied upon
to implement the deflationary policy.

This was also consistent with

the legacy of budgetary orthodoxy that prevailed in Japaq as elsewhere,
in the 1920's.

The basic estimates of government expenditures and re

venues37 are presented in Table 7, and pertinent ratios in Table 8.
The decrease in government expenditures relative to net domestic pro
duct between 1921 and 1925 is impressive, as is the even sharper use in
the next three years, the abrupt decline in 1929-1930 (especially at the
central level), and the rapid rise in 1931-1932.

Thereafter the growth

of government expenditures was outstripped by the growth of net domestic
product.

Interestingly, the total government sector ran deficits con

tinuously from 1926, while the central government deficit between 19271929 turned to surplus in 1930-1931, before turning again to deficits.
This suggests that fiscal policy had a deflationary impact until the mid1920's, but was more or less expansive thereafter except for 1929-1931.
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Table 7
Consolidated Central Plus Local Government Expenditures and
Revenues (million yen)
Government Expenditure

Year

Total

(1)
1910
680
1911
828
1912
696
1913
682
1914
698
1915
657
1916
661
1917
897
1918 1,250
1919 1,817
1920 2,350
1921 2,404
1922 2,487
1923 2,331
1924 2,425
1925 2,351
1926 2,503
1927 2,837
1928 3,148
1929 2,912
1930 2,438
1931 2,690
1932 3,076
1933 3,384
1934 3,309
1935 3,550
1936 3,684
1937 5,788
1938 8,007
1939 8,778
1940 11,711

Militarya

(2)
186
206
201
192
222
240
273
391
641
981
940
842
693
530
487
448
437
494
519
497
444
462
705
886
953
1,043
1,089
3,299
5,984
6,495
7,967

Government
Revenue

.
C
Savings

Government
Surplus or
Deficit

Note: Central
Government
Surplus

Investment b

Total

(3)

(4)

( 5)

(6)

(7)

697
803
803
813
782
768
894
1,118
1,358
1,864
1,902
2,163
2,489
2,256
2,465
2,535
2,445
2,456
2,574
2,518
2,121
2,045
2,077
2,209
2,543
2,715
2,978
4,286
4,107
4,785
6,510

184
189
292
317
248

17
- 25
107
131
84

254

111

78
17
138
149
94
97
204
190
65
31
-383
-160
36
- 14
47
202
78
- 93
-173
-156
265
50
-473
-470
-547
-561
-385
-2,047
-3,799
-3,992
-4,588

167
214
185
186
165
143
139
207
270
432
685
681
756
747
778
753
872
878
865
871
608
545
631
679
632
647
687
755
901
1,167
1,472

372
428
377
479
237
440
758
672
818
937
814
497
291
477
291
-100

-368
-496
-134
-188
- 19
-747
-2,999
-2,826
-3,729

233
221

108
47
-448
-241
2

- 75

4o

184
- 58
-381
-574
-394
-317
-645
-999
-1,175
- 766
- 835
- 706
-1,502
-3,900
-3,993
-5,201

Note: Expenditures consist of purchases of goods and services plus current subsidies
and transfers to the private sector.
a: Narrowly defined to exclude military .. pensions and interest on the government debt.
b: Excludes all military investment; all military expenditures are regarded as current.
c: Government revenues minus the sumof government current purchases of goods and services, subsidies and transfers.
d: Government revenues minus expenditures (Col. 4 - Col. l); by definition it also is
government savings minus investment (Col. 5 - Col. 3).
Source: Ern.i and Shinoya, Government Expenditures, Vol. 7, LTES. Data in Col. 7 for
1930-40 are based on general account revenues in Prime Minister's office, Japan Sta-.
tistical Yearbook 1950 (Tokyo: 1951).
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Table 8
Ratios of Militar y to Total Expend itures and of Government
Expend itures to Net Domest ic Produc t (in per cent)

Year

1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

Source s:

Centra l
Government
Expend iture

43.5
42,5
49.9
46.6
50.9
57.7
65.2
64.7
73.0
76.2
60.5
56.2
48.4
39,7
33.9
34.2
31.6
30.3
29.4
29,5
41.7
34.9
39.1
46.o
48.3
50,7
52.0
77.3
92.0
88.3
85,9

Militar y Expend itures to
Centra l and
Local Govern ment Expend iNet Domestic
tures
Produc t

'27 .4
24.9
28.9
28.2
31.8
36.5
41.3
43.6
51.3
54.o
40.0
35.0
27.9
22.7
20.l
19.l
17.5
12.4
16.5
17.1
18.2
17.2
22.9
26.2
28.8
29.4
29.6
57,0
74,7
74.o
68.o

5.8
5.3
4.6
4.2
5.4
5.6
5.1
5.3
6.1
7,7

7.1
6.7
5.4
4.0
3.4
3.0
3.0
3.4
3,6
3,5
3,6
4.1
5,5
6.1
6.3
6.3
5,9
15.4
23.0
19.3
21.2

Centra l to
Net Domestic Produc t

13.2
12,5
9.1
9.1
10.5
9,7
7.8
8.2
8.4
10.l
11.7
11.9
11.2
10.l
10.0
8.8
9.6
11.2
12.1
11.8
8.7
11.6
14.2
13,3
13.0
12.5
11.4
19.9
25.0
21.9
24.7

Table 7 and net domest ic produc t data underly ing Table 1.

Centra l Plus
Local to Net
Domest ic
Produc t

21.0
21.3
15.8
15.0
16.8
15.4
12.4
12.2
12.0
14.3
17.8
19.0
19.4
17,7
16.9
15.8
17,3
19.4
21.6
20.4
18.9
21.9
22.9
21.5
21.3
20.7
19,3
26.9
30.8
26.1
31.1
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The change in composition of expenditures in the 1920 1 s is strik
ing.

Military expenditures dropped sharply on an absolute basis, and even

more sharply relative to total government expenditures and to net domestic
product.

This was possible because of the Washington Conference of 1922,

which not only forestalled an imminent arms race but also provided the
basis for a Japanese security policy of "armament reduction and coopera
tion with the Western powers. 1138

Government investment expenditures, for

public works, etc., rose, as did current expenditures for non-military
purposes.
The government's spasmodic use of fiscal and monetary measures
during the 1920 1 s not only were not sufficient in deflationary effect
to restore balance of payments equilibrium and the exchange rate at pre
war parity, but resulted in a general malaise in the economy.

The lS-

27 financial crisis at home, and the return of all the major Western
powers to the gold standard by 1928 was too much.

The pressures in

Japan to resolve the gold standard problem once and for all finally
came to a boil.

The drift had continued too long.

The chronic instabil

ity of the domestic financial system and of domestic economic performance
seemed somehow tied up with the government's prolonged failure to take care
of the matter.
Businessmen producing for foreign trade and foreign traders felt that
exchange rate fluctuation, which had become much more erratic in the
spring of 1928 due to the troubles in China was detrimental to business,
since it increased the risk of the profitability of foreign trade.
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Large banks had come out of the 1927 crisis with large amounts of sur
plus funds; deposits had accrued to them and they became somewhat con
servative in lending to Japanese business.

They wanted to make liquid

investments in the United States as interest rates there rose during
1928 and most of 1929.

Annumber of banks did so in large amounts, and

at a market exchange rate which was below parity.

The banks were anxious

to see Japan return to the gold standard at the old parity not only to

be protected from possible losses due to exchange rate fluctuation but also
to make an exchange profit on short-term funds held abroad.
Ministry of Finance officials were worried about the 230 million
yen sterling debt falling due between July 1930-January 1931.

They

wanted to refund it by new debt issue, but apparently financial houses
in London and New York were unwilling to underwrite a new government
bond issue unless Japan displayed its credit-worthiness by following
sensible economic policies--including return to a gold standard fixed
exchange rate.
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Japan still had fairly large foreign exchange reserves

(1,199 million yen at the end of 1928), and most (1,084 million yen)
was held at home in the form of gold.
It is difficult to disentangle this concatenation of forces to

determine what were the most important reasons.

It probably was quite

natural that the Hamaguchi Cabinet coming into power in July, 1929,
would announce a decision to return to the gold standard, at the pre
war par, at the earliest possible date.

The decision was based on an

expectation that some domestic adjustment would be necessary, but it

4 7.

would not be great because of continued prosperity for the world econ
omy.

Prior to the decision several economic commentators urged a re

turn to gold at a lower parityJ around $40/100 yen.
brushed off by those making the decision.

Their views were

Apparently the feeling pre

vailed that devaluation would be a shameful affront to national honor. 41
Japan's exchange rate was then pegged at $4-5/100 yen, and its
wholesale price level was at about 165 (1913
ly above England and the United States.

= 100), still substantial

A precondition for returning

to the gold standard was to push down Japan's price level sufficiently,
and thereby the market determined exchange rate would normally move up
to the desired parity level.
An orthodox approach was implemented:

an austere fiscal and some

what restrictive monetary policy, with main reliance, symbolically and
in terms of its economic impact, on the former.
were cut, while tax rates were maintained.

Government expenditures

The Bank of Japan did not

raise its discount rate, but reduced to loans.

A serious difficulty

for monetary policy was that the banking system was so liquid as a re
sult of Bank of Japan liberal steps in the 1927 crisis; this reduced
subsequent Bank of Japan control.
to drift downwards.

Interest rates reversed a tendency

The government also aided industries in the pro

cess of cost-cutting, already underway.
The policy was successful in terms of its objectives.

The whole

sale price index declined by 6 per cent in six months, and continued to
drop sharply in 1930 (though in part as a result of the transmission of
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the world depression to Japan).
moved up to par.
nificantly,

The foreign exchange rate quickly

Moreover, foreign exchange reserves increased sig

This resulted not only because of the actions taken by the

government but also due to the expectations thus generated.

Speculators

saw the opportunity and bought yen (for foreign currency); the inflow
of short-term capital was substantial.
purchase of imports and rushed exports.
up .the yen exchange .rate.

Foreign traders postponed the
Both of these helped to push

However, both these forces were temporary and

. -inherently to be r6verse.d ...once the gold standard was· reattained; to the

·· extent that· they were significant they resulted in an overestimation of
the-true re-st.oration of Japau-1 s competi.tive position.

As it tu.rned .out,...

··this ··probably di.d not·matter too much, becausa Japan 1 s competitive po.:.
- -sit.ion was due to be-severely eroded and its gold standard status under·
-irresistible attack from the rapid deterioration of the international eco.,;.
:nomy and thereby the institutional environmentfor world trade .and capi- -

tal flows in 1930-1931.. · I have argued that it wils a fundamental mistake to return to the
gold t:tandard at the prewar parity anytime in the 1920 1 s,

The defla

tionary burden, the costs in tenns. of economic growth, the social and
--pol.itica.l -effects in terms of income redistribution, distress and .ten
sions, wcrl:! all too great.,

More·ovtllr, by coincidence, the timing of

,Japan's return to the___gold standArd (on January 11, 1930) could not
.have..been worse:

the world economy had just ~gun to toboggan· down

on the most serious And extended adversi-t.y it has ever had to suffer.
Unfortunately, the Japanese did not realize that; New York's stock

market crash appeared only a temporary set-back.
World prices declined sharply (see Table 4); accelerated deflation
in Japan could not keep pace.

The bottom fell out of the United States

silk market, Japan's single most important export commodity.
current account of the balance of payments was in deficit.
basis long-term capital flowed out rather than in.
tremendous outflow of short-term capital.

l!-2

The

On a net

Even worse was the

Speculators, who previously

felt confident that Japan could go onto the gold standard, now felt
equally sure that, because of the changed world environment, Japan could
not remain on the gold standard.

Many large banks and trust companies,

and eventually wealthy individual investors, participated in these short
term capital outflows, for both interest rate differential and specula•
tive reasons.

Speculation against the yen was enhanced when England

went off the gold standard in September, lS:31.
country--some 675 millions worth.

Gold poured out of the

Overall Japan lost 7G6 million yen

(5G.5 per cent) of its foreign exchanges reserves in the brief period
it was on the gold standard.

At the same time the Japanese economy was

sinking into the slough of depression, due both to the deflationary
policies and to the impact of the c0llapsing world economy.
It was inevitable that Japan should go off the gold standard, as
it did in December, 1931.
anticipated:

What followed probably could not have been

one of the most brilliant and highly successful combina

tions of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange rate policies, in an
adverse international environment, that the world has ever seen.

The

so.
basic decision was to generate incomes and demand at home by large
scale deficit financing and easy money, and to let the balance of pay
ments take care of itself by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate as
much as necessary.

This would encourage exports and discourage imports,

both desirable for domestic expansion.

The crucial decision was to for

sake the interrelated objectives of a) being on the gold standard, and
b) having the yen exchange at its prewar parity.

Adherence to this ob

jective was the ultimate cause of the difficulties of the 1920's.

Its

repudiation removed the major obstacle to expansionary fiscal and mone
tary policies to get out of depression and once again start on rapid
growth. l'.~3
The only effective way for an industrial country to come out of
(excess capacity) depression is to spend its way out.

In this the gov

ernment has to take the lead, since business expectations are ususally
quite pessimistic about the future.

The Japanese government pursued

this approach with great vigor and success.

For 1931-33, government

expenditures increased by 26 per cent, and net domestic product grew
at a comparable rate.

Probably equijlly important, three-quart~rs of the

rise in government expenditures was deficit-finance d; tax revenues were
held down, providing a multiplicative effect on private demand (Table
7).

Throughout the 1930 1 s the government ran large deficits--suffi cient

ly large that revenues did not even cover current purchases of goods and
services and transfer payments (i.e., government

saving was negative).

Significantly, almost three-fifths of the increase in government
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expenditures during the 1930 1 s prior to the outbreak of the war with
China in 1937 was for military uses.

Much of the increase followed

immediately upon the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

We have fairly de

tailed functional estimates only for central government expenditures
in certain benchmark years.

Between 1930 and 1935, of the 946 million

yen increase in central government expenditures, 62 per cent was for
military uses, 14 per cent for social welfare, 7 per cent for trans
portation, agriculture and other economic services, and 17 per cent
for interest on the expanding national debt.

l:-t+

Monetary policy was an important complement to fiscal policy, though
as probably is inevitable in a depression it was less important since
financial institutions were wary of lending to business.

The Bank of

Japan probably should.have taken positive steps to increase commercial
bank reserves rather than standing ready to rediscount upon request.
~

Since

requests were limited, as shown in Table 6, it did not expand credit great
ly to the private sector.
1937.

Money supply increased only moderately until

What the Bank of Japan did do was to underwrite the government

bond issues from 1932 on.

It purchased outright that portion not sub

scribed to by the Ministry of Finance Deposit Bureau.

As government de

ficit-financed expenditures resulted in an increase in commercial bank
deposits, banks were eager to purchase government bonds from the Bank of
Japan until the mid-1S30 1 s when they began, once again, to engage in pri
vate lending.

The Bank of Japan lowered its discount rate far below any

previous minimum level, to 3.29 per cent in 1~36 as compared with 6.57

52.
per cent at the end of 1931.

The average yield on governmen t bonds de

creased from 6.0 to 3.9 per cent between 1932 and 1936; the commercia l
bank average lending rate did not decline so much, form 5.8 to 4.6 per
cent.

Lowered interest rates and easy money abetted the rapid recovery

and the new surge of growth that was soon underway.
The foreign exchange rate plummeted as soon as Japan left the gold
standard, hitting the pre-World War II low relative to the dollar of $20.70/
100 yen in December, 1932.
dollar.

The pound was also depreciat ing relative to the

At the end of 1933, the Japanese governmen t decided to peg the

yen to the pound, but at a rate some L:-3 per cent below what it had been
when both yen and pound had been on the gold standard (see Table Li-).

This

was a major net depreciat ion in a world of depreciat ing currencie s.
The effect on Japanese exports of drastical ly reduced prices in
terms of foreign currencie s was highly beneficia l; exports increased
rapidly.

The net effect on the world was probably beneficia l too be

cause, with the balance of payments constrain t lifted, Japan grew more
rapidly and thereby increased its demand for imports.

Nonethele ss, ex

change rate depreciat ion was sufficien tly large that Japan's trade ba
lance tended to improve; its balance on current account moved to surplus
and remained so until 1937.

There is some merit in the criticism that

Japan pursued a beggar-my -neighbor policy; in the world economy at that
time, though, neighbors had to look out for themselve s.
The success of this period of Japanese economic policy, despite a
much more difficult world environme nt as compared with the 1930's, is
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manifested in the rapid economic growth wfuich occurred once the new
policies were undertaken (see Table 1).
late.

But this success occurred too

By 1936 the military were entrenched in a strong power position,

perhaps impossible to dislodge.

As the economy approached capacity op

eration in 1936, it became desirable to slow down the expansion of govern
ment expenditures.
the military.

This was, of course, in conflict with the desires of

The assassination on February 25, 1936, of Finance Min

ister Takahashi, who had so ably guided Japan through its "reflation"
period, marked the end of any possibility of restoring power to the
business-political parties group.

The expansive fiscal and monetary

policies were to continue, and increasingly strict direct controls to
be imposed, as Japan went

onto

and eventually the United States.

wartime footing first to fight China
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It remains to explore in this section some broader implication s of Japan's
interwar economic performance , and to raise questions if not provide answers. A
fundamental question is:

to what extent did economic factors, and just what

factors, cause Japan to choose, or stumble onto, the path it did which led to
militarism and war?

In raising this issue I do not want to grapple with the

broader problem of historical interpretat ion:

whether Japan's path in the 1930's

was an aberration from the basic trend of the democratic, modernizati on process
of the 1920's and earlier and renewed after World War II; or whether it was a
natural, likely, perhaps virtually inevitable consequence of the social and
political stresses and strains emanating from the very process of modernizati on.
Nonetheless , with the gradual passing away of the Meiji oligarchy, the
1920's presented an opportunity for nascent parliamenta ry democracy, based on
business-or iented political parties, to display its ability as a system to sus
tain relatively rapid economic growth, to overcome or at least ameliorate the
tensions of growth, and to cope with the country's security objectives.

The

basic policy stance of the governments of the 1920's was internation alist, of
cooperation in the world order of the West.

Economicall y this meant the early

postwar restoration of multilatera l, relatively free trade and of a gold stan
dard fixed exchange rate system, together with free movement of short-term and
long-term capital.

National secuirty was also met by cooperation with the West,

including general acceptance of the status quo, which implied Japanese hegemony
in East Asia.

In this internation al environment , created in large part by the

Washington Conference of 1922 and the Kellogg-Bri and Pact, it was possible to re
trench on armaments and overall military expenditure s.
The internation alist policy of the 1920's failed, and with it parliamenta ry
democracy and political parties failed the test opportunity presented.

I do not
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mean to imply that this was the only test, or that failure inevitably signalled
the effective end of the party system; those judgments are for political his
torians to make.

Nor do I mean that the military immediately and directly took

over; their encroachmen t was less rapid until 1936 or 1937,

It is obvious that

the failure was in large part attributabl e to economic causes.
tors, one exogenous and the other endogenous, were critical:

Two such fac
the breakdown,

with the Great Depression, of the world economic order; and the mediocre per
formance of Japan's economy in the 1920's.
The collapse of the world economy, in addition to sharply lowering total
demand for internation ally traded goods, shifted the emphasis away from free
trade to increasing trade restriction s, from multilatera lism to increasing bi
lateralism, from fixed exchange rates based on parity with gold to fluctuating ,
competitive ly depreciatin g exchange rates unlinked to gold and brought an end
to long-term capital lending.
Japan played superlative ly.

In this new internation al game with new rules
The exchange rate and the balance of payments were

no longer a constraint on domestic economic growth.

It is ironic that at the

time when Japan's internation al economic performance , operating in world mar
kets, was so successful, the domestic swing in its policy stance was towards
autarchy.
The very success of Japan's internation al economic performance between
1932 and 1936 suggests that we should attribute the dominant economic factor in
the failure of parliamenta ry democracy to the distinct lack of success of macro
economic policy prior to 1932.

Japanese policymaker s succeeded only in ex

acerbating social tensions, not in amelioratin g them.
The off-again-o n-again deflationar y policy of the 1920's was clearly a
calamitous mistake.

An acceptance of, say, the 1922 level of prices as reason

able, a correspondi ngly appropriate exchange rate adjustment, and the return
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then to the gold standard would, by hindsight, have been much more efficacious.
The domestic economy would not have needed to be subjected to the continual
buffeting it received, and could have gone about its business of growth.

This

fundamental error -- to return to gold at the prewar par -- was compounded by
the cataclysmic timing of the actual re-establishment of the prewar parity in
returning to the gold standard at the beginning of 1930.

Incidentally, big

business by speculating against the yen in 1930 and 1931 succeeded in under
cutting the very basis of their political power.

From then on, they would have

increasingly to make deals directly with the military.
The alternative to internationalism was decreased reliance on the West
and, eventually, on autarkic bloc economy.

Not surprisingly the proponents of

this option were the military, who saw the issues primarily in security rather
than economic terms.

They were apprehensive over the London Naval Treaty of

1930, whereby it appeared national security was being compromised for the sake
of budgetary retrenchment and adherence to the gold standard. 45

The military

leaders were not a bunch of wild-eyed, righ-wing, young conspirators intent
upon a coup by which they could manipulate ministers of state.

They, and those

from all elements of Japan's broadly defined elite who supported them, were on
the whole reasonable, responsible
cremental

men making relatively conscious, mostly in

decisions based on their perceptions of the changing world and the

options available.

In the perceptions of the militarists and many others the

internationalist approach had failed by 1931, for both foreign and domestic
reasons.

They proposed what they considered to be superior alternatives.

This is

not to say that the military were wholly altrustic; they too were elitist and
presumptuous, contemptuous of parliamentary democracy.

The expenditures re

trenchments of the 1920's, predicted upon absolute cut-backs of personnel and
restrictions upon armament aims, disturbed the military greatly.

They had been
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used to a greater share of the central government budget and of GNP, and of
attendant political power, and they wanted "their share" back.
But suppose the foreign exchange rate--balance of payments problem had been
solved in the early 1920's and the economy had grown more rapidly and more stably.
Would that have resolved the difficulties inherent in the differential structure?
It probably would have done no more than ameliorate them--but perhaps that would
have been enough.

More rapid growth would have been mainly in the industrial

sector; with the stable prices there would probably have been less substitution
of capital and labor.

Together these would have meant a greater absorption of

unskilled labor into manufacturing, as indeed occurred during the 1930's.
the unskilled-skill ed wage differential would have remained.
deprivation of the unskilled have led to their discontent?

But

Would this relative
Or was it the in

ability to find factory jobs, the absolute decline in money wages which were the
real issues generating so much friction?

I suspect it was the latter.

The real difficulty, even with successful industrial performance, could
well have been agriculture.
remained.

There the differential structure would likely have

A lower exchange rate and a stable price, instead of the deflationary

policy, would have made for more favorable price incentives for agriculture than
existed.

Silk incomes, in yen, would have been even higher, but still subject

to the precipitous decline in world prices after 1926.

Rice was imported from

the colonies which were on the yen standard, so exchange rate devaluation would
not have helped.

The policy of importing cheap rice was in principle efficient

in the long run since resources in Japanese agriculture should be transferred
into manufacturing.

But the rub was in the long time it would take these re

sources--partic ularly labor--to be absorbed in manufacturing.

It simply could

not have been achieved quickly enough to prevent a long adjustment period of
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agrarian relative deprivati on and, presumabl y, disconten t.
on the horns of an income distribut ion dilemma:

The governmen t was

a relativel y high price of rice

and other foodstuff s would maintain, and enhance, incomes in agricultu re, but at
the expense of the disconten t of urban workers and capitalis ts.

But an import

program, while helping urban owrkers and their employers , hurt farm incomes.

How

ever, a better pricing policy would at least have prevented agricultu ral incomes
from declining absolutel y.
Even if better price incentive s had existed for agricultu re, it is not
clear that this alone would have been sufficien t to increase productiv ity in agri
culture at the rate at which it had been growing between 1885 and 1919,

It seems

inevitabl e that a different ial structure emerges in the phase of the industria li
zation process when the demand for skilled labor outstrips supply and large re
servoirs of unskilled labor remain.

Until the industria l sector is large enough

and growing rapidly enough to absorb large amounts of unskilled workers, their
wages will not increase substanti ally.

Perhaps social tensions are bound to

increase during this phase of developme nt because of the observabl e differenc es
in income received by capitalis ts, by skilled workers, and by farmers and un
skilled non-farm workers.
The problem then for the ruling governmen t in an industria lizing nation is
how to keep these tensions within bounds, to ameliorat e condition s such that
military coups, or revolutio ns, do not occur.

At the least, the real incomes of

large groups cannot be allowed to fail absolutel y.

More positivel y, the real

incomes of the surplus labor (notably that in agricultu re) may well have to rise
somewhat, though less than that of capitalis ts or of skilled labor.
wage-type legislatio n will not achieve this.

Minimum

It may even be difficult , and per

haps undesirab le from the developm ental process of mobilizin g savings, to move
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the agricult ural-ma nufactu ring terms of trade in favor of agricult ure.

Essen

tially, the only hope seems to lie in raising product ivity, output, and hence
real income in agricult ure.
Objectiv e economic conditio ns are importa nt not only in themselv es but
particu larly as they affect the percept ions, objectiv es and tactics of those in
politica l power and those attempti ng to achieve power.

For Japan this involved

on the one hand the politica l activiti es of various economic interes t groups- 
such as "old" and "new" zaibatsu , workers , landlord s, small land owning- cultivat 
ing farmers, tenants , and whateve r organiz ations they had--and on the other hand
the concern with economic issues, and economic bases of (econom ic and politica l)
support of the various politica l actors- -parties , various strata of the Army and
Navy, etc.

We should separate the influenc e of economic difficu lties on the

objectiv es of politic al actors from their capitali zing upon these difficu lties
as a means of attainin g power.

Objectiv ely, some of the economic issues of the

late 192O's and early 193O's were false, though probably not entirely so in
the percepti ons of the importan t politica l actors.
Much more analysis is needed of the percepti ons by the politica l actors
of the economic realitie s of interwa r Japan.

For example , the military per

ception that the basic conflict involvin g agricult ure was the capital ists versus
the farmer, rather than the landlord versus the tenant, is highly revealin g.
So were military and bureaucr acy percepti ons of the foreign trade environm ents,
particu larly the evolving feeling that world prices for many imports they needed
for military purposes were rigged by interna tional cartels and that they simply
could not obtain sufficie nt foreign exchange for their (expandi ng) definiti on
of minimum military requirem ents.

Increasi ngly they came to feel that the only

viable alternat ive was for Japan to develop its own bloc economy in a relative ly
autarkic manner.

The complex ities of these issues suggest that we need to
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explore the varying relationships among big business, the political parties,
the bureaucracy and the military--and the degree to which these relationships
were affected by economic causes--before we can assess fully the extent to which
economic factors, and which factors, were responsible for Japan's taking the
militaristic path of the 1930's.
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